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The single-crossing property on a tree
A. Clearwater, C. Puppe and A. Slinko
Abstract
We generalize the classical single-crossing property to single-crossing
property on trees and obtain new ways to construct Condorcet domains
which are sets of linear orders which possess the property that every
profile composed from those orders have transitive majority relation. We
prove that for any tree there exist profiles that are single-crossing on that
tree; moreover, that tree is minimal in this respect for at least one such
profile. Finally, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm to recognize
whether or not a given profile is single-crossing with respect to some
tree. We also show that finding winners for Chamberlin-Courant rule is
polynomial for profiles that are single-crossing on trees.
1 Introduction
Condorcet’s famous paradox demonstrates that pairwise majority voting may produce
intransitive collective preferences. The question whether, and if so, how, this problem can
be overcome by means of restrictions on the domain of admissible individual preferences
has attracted constant interest over the recent decades, see Gaertner (2001) for a detailed
overview. Probably the best-known of these is single-peakedness Black (1948) which is
frequently employed in models of political economy. It stipulates that all alternatives
can be arranged along one dimension, for instance according to the political left-right
spectrum. The concept of single-peakedness itself can be generalized considerably, how-
ever, the sufficiency of single-peakedness for transitivity of the (strict) majority relation
is confined to the classical one-dimensional case.1
A different and frequently useful sufficient condition for transitivity of the majority
relation is the following single-crossing property. Suppose that voters can be arranged on
a one-dimensional linear spectrum. A profile of individual preferences is said to have the
single-crossing property if, for all pairs of alternatives (a, b), the set of voters who prefer a
to b forms a convex set in the one-dimensional spectrum. As shown by Rothstein (1991),
in every single-crossing profile there exists the so-called representative voter, i.e., a voter
whose (strict) preference coincides with the (strict) majority relation.2
1Single-peakedness on trees still guarantees the existence of a Condorcet winner, and single-peakedness
on a median graph the existence of a “local” Condorcet winner Bandelt and Barthe´le´my (1984).
2One can show that such result does not hold for single-peaked preferences even on a line.
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Roberts (1977) and Gans and Smart (1996) provide a number of economic applications
of single-crossingness. All of them represent situations when preferences of individuals
depend on a single parameter. For example, in Roberts’ seminal paper voters’ preferences
on the level of taxation depend solely on their income: the lower the income the higher
taxation this individual prefers. However, if the state provides subsidies for families with
children, this condition may not be satisfied. But if we fix the income we will find single-
crossing condition relative to the second parameter, i.e., the more children the person has
the higher the level of taxation she prefers. So there are compelling economic reasons
which prompt us to consider single-crossingness on graphs more general than a line.
In contrast to the case of single-peaked preferences, the sufficiency of the single-crossing
property for transitivity of the strict majority relation generalizes to a larger class of
graphs. In the present paper, we prove the transitivity of the strict majority relation and
a representative voter theorem for single-crossing profiles on trees. This result also follows
from the analysis of Demange (2012) based on the notion of intermediate preferences
Grandmont (1978).
The second part of the paper is devoted to algorithmic aspects. First, we give a con-
structive proof of the existence of a single-crossing profile for any tree with n vertices. We
prove that n alternatives are always sufficient and that there exist trees for which single-
crossing profiles with less than n alternatives do not exist. We also give a polynomial-time
algorithm that recognizes whether or not a given profile is single-crossing with respect
to some tree. Finally, we prove that the Chanberlin-Courant multi-winner voting rule
on single-crossing profiles on trees has a polynomial time winner-determination prob-
lem which generalises a similar result of Skowron et al. (2013) for classical single-crossing
property. It is interesting to note that for the single-peaked property on a tree only
the egalitarian version of the Chanberlin-Courant rule remains polynomial. The classical
utilitarian version of this rule becomes NP-hard Yu et al. (2013).
The problem addressed in the present paper is closely related to the search of so-called
(maximal) “Condorcet domains” Abello and Johnson (1984); Abello (1991); Galambos and Reiner
(2008); Danilov et al. (2012); see also the survey on the topic in Monjardet (2009). Indeed,
any single-crossing profile on a tree provides us with a new type of Condorcet domain
(although possibly not maximal).
2 Preliminaries
Let A and V be two finite sets of cardinality m and n respectively. The elements of A
will be called alternatives, the elements of V = {1, 2, . . . , n} voters. We assume that the
voters have preferences over the set of alternatives. By L(A) we denote the set of all
(strict) linear orders on A; they represent the preferences of agents over A. The elements
of the Cartesian product L(A)n = L(A)× . . .× L(A) (n times) are called n-profiles or
simply profiles. They represent the collection of preferences of an n-element society of
voters V over alternatives from A. If a linear order Ri ∈ L(A) represents the preferences
of the i-th agent, then by aRib, where a, b ∈ A, we denote that this agent prefers a to b.
We also denote this as a ≻i b.
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Definition 1. Let R = (R1, . . . , Rn) be a profile. The majority relation M(R) of R over
A is the binary relation on A such that for any a, b ∈ A we have a  b if and only if
|({i | aRib}| ≥ |({i | bRia}|.
When n is odd, the majority relation is a tournament on A, i.e., complete and asym-
metric binary relation. When n is even, we may have an indifference when both a  b
and b  a which we denote as a ∼ b. We will also write a ≻ b if a  b but not b  a and
call it the strict majority relation.
Definition 2. A Condorcet Domain is a set of linear orders C ⊆ L(A) such that, no
matter how many voters in the profile P have each of the linear orders from C as their
preference relation, the strict majority relation of P is transitive.
A tree is a connected graph T = (V,E) with the set of vertices V and the set of edges
E such that |E| = |V | − 1. Since there is a unique path between two vertices u and v
we can define the distance d(u, v) between them as the number of edges in the unique
path between u and v. A subgraph T1 = (V1, E1) is a subtree of T , if it is a tree in its
own right. Intersection of any two subtrees is a subtree. If any edge in a tree T = (V,E)
is removed, the tree becomes a union of two disconnected subtrees. See ? for these and
further facts about trees.
3 Condorcet domains related to trees
3.1 The single-crossing property on a tree
This concept generalizes the classical definition of single-crossingness Mirrlees (1971);
Gans and Smart (1996).
Definition 3. Let P be an n-voter profile with the set of voters V and the set of alter-
natives A and T = (V,E) be a tree on the set of voters V . We say that the profile P
is single-crossing with respect to T if for every pair of alternatives a, b ∈ A one of the
following holds:
• We can remove an edge e = (i, j) from T so that for the two resulting subtrees
T1 = (V1, E1) and T2 = (V2, E2) all voters in V1 rate a above b and all voters in V2
rate b above a. In this case the edge e will be called ab-cut.
• All voters prefer a to b or all voters prefer b to a. In this case we say that the ab-cut
is virtual.
An ab-cut partitions the vertices V = Vab ∪ Vba, where Vab = {i ∈ N | a ≻i b} and
Vba = {i ∈ N | b ≻i a}; let Tab and Tba denote the corresponding subtrees of T .
Example 1 (Classical single-crossing profile). Suppose the set of alternatives A can be
endowed with a linear order >A such that for any two alternatives a, b ∈ A and for any
integers i, j ∈ N with i < j
a >A b and a ≻i b =⇒ a ≻j b.
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It is clear that for any pair of alternatives a, b ∈ A with a >A b, as k runs from 1 to n,
the relation b ≻k a switches to a ≻k b at most once. Hence for every pair a, b ∈ A we
can find k0 = k(a, b) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} such that we have b ≻k a for k ≤ k0 and a ≻k b for
k > k0. This means that such profile is single-crossing with respect to a linear graph
...........................................................................• •
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•
Let us show that when the tree is not linear we can obtain some new single-crossing
profiles which are not single-crossing in the classical sense.
Example 2. Let us consider the following profile, let us call it P , where voters 1,2,3,4
have preference orders a ≻1 b ≻1 c ≻1 d, a ≻2 c ≻2 b ≻2 d, d ≻3 a ≻3 c ≻3 b, and
c ≻4 b ≻4 a ≻4 d, respectively. Obviously, this profile is not a single-crossing in the
classical sense. If it were, then voter 3 must be either the first or the last on the line since
this is the only voter who ranks d above a. Voter 4 also must be the first or the last since
she is the only voter who ranks c above a. Finally voter 1 must be either first or the last
since she is the only one who ranks b above c.
However, it is easy to check that P is single-crossing with respect to the following graph
with vertices associated with voters in the following way:
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4
Indeed, for pairs (a, b) and (a, c) we have to cut the edge (2, 4). For pair (b, c) we have to
cut (1, 2) and for pairs (a, d), (b, d) and (c, d) we have to cut (2, 3).
The following generalisation of the classical Representative Voter Theorem Rothstein
(1991) follows from Demange (2012) but we give a direct proof.
Theorem 1 (Representative Voter Theorem). Let n be odd. If a profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn)
is single-crossing with respect to a tree T = (V,E), then there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such
that preference order Pi coincides with the majority relation.
Proof. Firstly we note that there is a natural absract convexity on trees ?: the set is
called convex if it is connected. It is easy to check that it satisfies the Helly property ?:
if for any family H of convex sets in which every two sets have a non-empty intersection
we have
⋂
H∈HH 6= ∅.
Let, as above, Vxy be the set of voters who prefer x to y. These sets are convex.
Consider the set of subsets M = {Hxy | x ≻ y}, where ≻ is the majority relation. Any
two subsets Hxy, Hzt ∈ M have a nonempty intersection since each of them contains
a majority of all vertices. By the Helly property we have
⋂
Hxy∈M
Hxy 6= ∅. Voters’
preferences in this intersection coincide with the majority relation.
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In Example 2 voter 2 is the representative voter.
We need one easy observation.
Lemma 1. Let {P1, . . . , Pn} is a set of distinct linear orders over a set of alternatives
A, and let k1, . . . , kn be positive integers. Consider a profile Q = (P
k1
1 , . . . , P
kn
n ), where
linear order Pi is repeated ki times. Then a profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) is single-crossing on
a tree iff Q = (P k11 , . . . , P
kn
n ) is also single-crossing on (another) tree.
Proof. Suppose P is single-crossing on a tree T with n vertices 1, 2, . . . , n in which we
identified Pi with i. In the trivial case where n = 1, Q = (P
k1
1 ) is single-crossing on
a line of vertex 1 repeated k1 times, and for all pairs of alternatives the cut is virtual.
Otherwise, n > 1 and we take an arbitrary edge (i, j) now and replace it with the line
(i, i1, . . . , ik, j). If we now associate k copies of Pi with vertices i1, . . . , ik and do it for
every i, we claim that Q is single-crossing on this new so obtained tree T ′. The cuts for
the new tree should be as follows: If the edge (i, j) had a cut for some pair of alternatives,
then T ′ should have the cut for the same pair of alternatives done on the edge (ik, j) of
T ′.
Suppose now that Q is single-crossing for some tree T . For every pair of alternatives
(a, b) such that a ≻i b let us consider a subtree Tab, where voters corresponding to vertices
all prefer a to b. Then the subtree TP =
⋂
a≻ib
Tab is nonempty and contains all vertices
corresponding to ki copies of Pi in Q. Since there are no cuts to edges of this tree we can
glue all its vertices together and associate with Pi in P . We leave all cuts in the new tree
where they were.
Let P be a profile. By D(P ) we denote the set of all unique linear orders present in
P .
Theorem 2. Let P be a profile which is single-crossing with respect to a tree. Then D(P )
is a Condorcet domain.
Proof. Let Q = (Q1, . . . , Qm) be a profile with Qi ∈ D(P ) for all i. By Lemma 1 we can
add linear orders Qm+1, . . . , Qn so that the extended profile Q̂ = (Q1, . . . , Qn) is single-
crossing on a tree T = (V̂ , E), where V̂ = {1, . . . , n}. We will also denote V = {1, . . . , m}.
Suppose that a ≻ b and b ≻ c, where ≻ is the majority relation for Q. Then we have
two partitions of V , namely, V = Vab ∪ Vba and V = Vbc ∪ Vcb, where Vxy is the set of
voters in {1, . . . , m} who prefer x to y. We have |Vab| > |Vba| and |Vbc| > |Vcb|. Obviously,
Vabc = Vab ∩ Vbc 6= ∅ since each of these sets contains a majority of voters. We have
Vab ⊆ V̂ab and Vbc ⊆ V̂bc, where V̂ab and V̂bc are connected. We cannot claim that V̂ab or V̂bc
contains more than half of all elements of V̂ but we know that V̂ab ∩ V̂bc ⊇ Vabc 6= ∅. Since
ac-cut in T cannot be located between vertices of V̂ab ∩ V̂bc, we have either V̂ac ⊃ V̂ab or
V̂ac ⊃ V̂bc which implies Vac ⊃ Vab or Vac ⊃ Vbc. This means a ≻ c and ≻ is transitive.
3.2 All trees produce Condorcet domains
For three alternatives we do not get anything new. We omit this proof due to space
constraints. We will now prove that for an arbitrary tree T there exists of a profile
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P which is single-crossing with respect to T and T is minimal. In fact we prove the
existence of a profile P over A where |A| = |V |, i.e., m = n. We note, however, that it is
not necessary for the number of voters to be the same as the number of alternatives.
Definition 4. Let P be a profile over a set of candidates A and let T = (V,E) be a tree.
If an edge (i, j) ∈ E is not the ab-cut for any alternatives a, b ∈ A then we say that (i, j)
is a collapsible edge. If T contains a collapsible edge then we say T is collapsible with
respect to P . Otherwise we say that T is minimal with respect to P . We call a profile
reduced if it does not contain identical linear orders.
Theorem 3. Let T = (V,E) be a tree with |V | = n ≥ 2. Then there exists a reduced
n-voter profile P over a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . , an} that is single-crossing with
respect to T and T is minimal for P . Moreover, n is the smallest number of alternatives
that allows, for any tree T with n vertices, to construct a profile which is single-crossing
with respect to T .
Proof. We prove the first part of the theorem by induction on n. The base case is the
only tree with two vertices for which the result is clear.
Suppose now that for an arbitrary tree T on n vertices there exists a profile P =
(P1, P2, ..., Pn) over A = {a1, a2, ..., an} which is single-crossing with respect to T and
every edge of T is the aiaj-cut for some ai, aj ∈ A.
Now, the inductive step. Consider the case for T = (V,E), a tree with n+ 1 vertices.
Remove any vertex of degree 1 (a leaf) from T , along with the edge that was connected
to that vertex, and call the resulting tree T ′. We label the vertices so that n + 1 is
removed, and the removed edge is (n, n+ 1). Now we have T ′ = (V ′, E ′) where |V ′| = n.
Then by the induction hypothesis there exists a reduced profile P ′ = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) over
a set of alternatives A′ = (a1, a2, . . . , an) that is single-crossing with respect to T
′ and
T ′ is minimal. Now add back the removed vertex and edge to recover the tree T . We
then have V = V ′ ∪ {n + 1} and E = E ′ ∪ (n, n + 1). Now we extend the profile P ′
to P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn, Pn+1) where Pn+1 is identical to Pn, and then extend the set of
alternatives A′ to A = (a1, a2, ..., an, an+1). We add alternative an+1 to each of P1, ..., Pn
immediately after an and immediately before an in Pn+1. Now voters n and n+ 1 do not
have identical preferences over A, and now we have a set of n+1 linear orders over n+1
alternatives and the resulting profile is reduced. Since an and an+1 appear consecutively
in all lists of preferences, an ≻j ai if and only if an+1 ≻j ai for any ai ∈ A \ {an, an+1}
and j = 1, 2, . . . , n + 1. Therefore the subtree where an is rated above ai is identical to
the subtree where an+1 is rated above ai, so the aian-cut is the same as the aian+1-cut so
the aian+1-cut exists for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. Also anan+1-cut is the new edge (n, n+1). It
follows that a cut exists for every pair of alternatives, so P is single-crossing with respect
to T and T is minimal.
Hence by induction for any tree T with |V | = n ≥ 2 there exists a profile P over a set
of alternatives A that is single-crossing with respect to T , where T is minimal.
To prove the second part let us consider the star graph Sn on n vertices whose one
vertex has degree n − 1 and all others are leaves. Reasoning by induction let us assume
that for Sn we cannot construct a profile with less than n alternatives for which Sn is
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the minimal tree. Consider Sn+1 and suppose towards a contradiction that we can find a
profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn+1) with n alternatives for which Sn+1 is minimal. Suppose that the
vertices of Sn+1 are numbered so that voter 1 has degree n and has preferences expressed
by the linear order a1 ≻1 a2 ≻1 . . . ≻1 an. Suppose, first, the a1a2-cut is not virtual for
Sn+1. Without loss of generality we may assume that a2 ≻n+1 a1. Then a1 ≻i a2 for all
i ≤ n. let us remove now vertex n + 1 from the graph. Then we get graph Sn and the
profile P ′ = P−(n+1) which is single-crossing on Sn. The a1a2-cut becomes virtual for P
′.
Let us now remove the alternative a1 from P
′ to obtain a profile P ′′. Then P ′′ is still
single-crossing on the tree Sn and we claim that Sn is minimal for P
′′. If not, then after
removal of a1, at least one edge, say (1, k) becomes without any cuts. Hence the only cut
it had was the cut a1aj for some j > 2. Then we had aj ≻k a1 ≻k a2 and see that (1, k)
had also a a2aj-cut. Thus Sn is minimal for P
′′ and P ′′ has n − 1 alternative which is a
contradiction.
We will now make a trivial but very useful observation.
Proposition 1. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a reduced profile which is single-crossing with
respect to a minimal tree T . Then a voter i is a leaf (vertex of degree 1) of T iff there
exist a pair of alternatives a, b ∈ A such that a ≻i b and b ≻j a for all j ∈ N \ {i}.
Proof. If i is a leaf, then it is connected to the rest of the tree with a single edge, say (i, k).
This edge is an ab-cut for some a, b ∈ A from which a ≻i b and b ≻j a for all j ∈ N \ {i}.
Conversely, if for some a, b ∈ A from which a ≻i b and b ≻j a for all j ∈ N \ {i}, then the
the ab-cut partitions T into a certain subtree T ′ and a single vertex i which means it was
a leaf.
Theorem 4. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a reduced profile over a set of alternatives A.
Suppose P is single-crossing. Then the minimal tree with respect to which P is single-
crossing is unique.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that P is single-crossing with respect to both T1 =
(V1, E1) and T2 = (V2, E2) and both are minimal. We prove that T1 = T2 by induction
on n = |T1| = |T2|. The case n = 1 is obvious. Now let P be a profile with n + 1 voters.
Choose a leaf from T1, say vertex i, and let the vertex to which i is connected be j. Since
it is a leaf it must be the only linear order in which x is preferred over y for some x, y ∈ A
and therefore vertex i must also be a leaf of T2.
Note that, if P is single-crossing with respect to a tree T , and we remove a leaf of T ,
say vertex ℓ (together with the edge leading to it), then we obtain a tree T−ℓ such that the
corresponding subprofile P−ℓ = (P1, ..., Pℓ−1, Pℓ+1, ..., Pn) is single-crossing with respect to
T−ℓ.
Therefore if we remove i from T1 and T2 we are left with subtrees T
′
1 and T
′
2 and P−i
is single-crossing with respect to both. Since |T ′1| = |T
′
2| = n, by the induction hypothesis
we must have T ′ = T ′1 = T
′
2. Suppose that (i, j) ∈ E1 and (i.k) ∈ E2. Then to recover T1
from T ′ we add the vertex i and the edge (i, j) to T ′ and to recover T2 from T
′ we add
the vertex i and the edge (i, k) to T ′ for some j, k different from i. If j 6= k then there
must be a path in T ′ from j to k, along which there must be at least one xy-cut since
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T is minimal for P . Then x ≻j y and y ≻k x for some x, y ∈ A. Making the xy-cut on
each of T1 and T2 we find that i ∈ Vxy ⊂ V1 and i ∈ Vyx ⊂ V2, so x ≻i y and y ≻i x,
a contradiction. Thus j = k, E1 = E2 and finally T1 = T2. So the tree with respect to
which P is single-crossing is unique.
We note that the new concept is not hereditary, i.e., not inherited by subprofiles. It is
easy to see that all subprofiles of P are single-crossing if and only if P is single-crossing
in the classical sense.
Theorem 5. Let P be a single-crossing profile. Then all subprofiles of P are single-
crossing if and only if P is single-crossing on a line.
Proof. It follows from the definition that if P is single-crossing on a line, then every
subprofile is single-crossing.
Now suppose that P is single-crossing with respect to a minimal tree T which is
not a line. This tree therefore must have a vertex of degree greater than 2, let this be
vertex i and let j, k, ℓ be three of its (arbitrarily chosen) neighbors. Then the subprofile
P ′ = (Pj, Pk, Pℓ) cannot be single-crossing on any tree. If it were single-crossing on a tree
T , then by Proposition 1 all three vertices of it must be leaves which is impossible.
4 Algorithmic aspects of single-crossedness
4.1 A recognition algorithm.
The main question of this section is to give a polynomial-time algorithm for recognising
single-crossing profiles. The property, which was used in Proposition 1 to recognise a
leaf when we knew that the profile had single-crossing property becomes too weak for
arbitrary profiles. We need a stronger property.
Definition 5. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a profile. We call i ∈ N a potential leaf if
(a) The set Si = {(a, b) ∈ A
2 | a ≻i b and b ≻j a for j 6= i} is nonempty;
(b) There exists k ∈ N such that a ≻i b ⇔ a ≻k b for all a, b ∈ A such that neither
(a, b) or (b, a) belongs to Si.
Just as a quick reality check we verify that if a profile P is single-crossing with respect
to a tree T , then a vertex is a leaf of T if and only if it is a potential leaf. So leaves and
potential leaves are equivalent for single-crossing profiles. However potential leaves are
more useful in the general case.
Lemma 2. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a profile and i ∈ N is a potential leaf of P . Then P
is single-crossing if and only if P−i is.
Proof. Suppose i is a potential leaf and that P−i is single-crossing with respect to a tree
T = (N \ {i}, V ). According to Definition 5, since i is a potential leaf of P , all ab-cuts
for T , where either (a, b) or (b, a) belongs to Si, are virtual. We add Pi to P−i, add i to T
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and connect i to k. Then (i, k) becomes an ab-cut for all a, b ∈ A for which either (a, b)
or (b, a) belongs to Si. All other cuts remain valid. This proves that P is single-crossing
with respect to T ′ = (N, V ∪ {(i, k)}.
Let us prove the converse. Suppose P is single-crossing and T = (V,E) be its minimal
tree. Then i is a leaf of T . In general, as we know, the single-crossing property is not
inherited by subprofiles. However when we remove a leaf (or several of them), then the
single-crossedness is preserved. Indeed, for every pair of alternatives x, y ∈ A the xy-cut
is either in Si, and then it becomes a virtual cut in T−i, or it is not. In the latter case,
V = Vxy ∪ Vyx, and suppose without loss of generality that i ∈ Vxy. Since i was a leaf of
T it will also be a leaf of Vxy, hence Vxy \ {i} is a subtree of T−i. Hence T−i has a xy-cut
and P−i is single-crossing with respect to T−i.
The idea of the recognition algorithm is now clear: we look for a potential leaf and
stop if we cannot find any. Otherwise we remove the potential leaf, remember where it
was attached and reduce the problem to the remaining subprofile. For a linear order Pi to
calculate Si we need
(
m
2
)
n operations, to find ki we need the same number of comparisons
and we have to try in the worst case scenario all n linear orders so 2
(
m
2
)
n2 operations in
total. We have to do it recursively n times so the total number of operations is at most
2
(
m
2
)
n3. We have proved
Theorem 6. For an input profile with n voters and m alternatives we can determine
whether or not this profile is single-crossing or not and, if it is, to construct the minimal
tree in O(m2n3) time.
4.2 Chanberlin-Courant rule
Given a society of n voters V with preferences over a set of m candidates A and a fixed
positive integer k ≤ m a method of fully proportional representation outputs a k-member
parliament, which is a subset of A, and assigns to each voter a candidate that will represent
this voter in the parliament. The Chanberlin-Courant and the Monroe rules were widely
discussed in Political Science and Social Choice literature.
It is well-known that on an unrestricted domain of preferences both rules are in-
tractable in the classical Meir et al. (2008); Lu and Boutilier (2011) and parameterized
complexity Betzler et al. (2013) senses. Skowron et al. (2013), however, showed that for
single-crossing elections the winner-determination problem for the Chanberlin-Courant
rule is polynomial-time solvable for every dissatisfaction function and both for the util-
itarian Chamberlin and Courant (1983) and egalitarian Betzler et al. (2013) versions of
the rule. They also generalized this result to elections with bounded single-crossing width
proving fixed-parameter tractability of the Chanberlin-Courant rule with single-crossing
width as parameter. The concept of single-crossing width was defined in Cornaz et al.
(2012).
Here we will prove that polynomial solvability remains for single-crossing profiles on
any tree. But, firstly, we will remind the reader the definitions needed for discussing the
Chanberlin-Courant rule. By posv(c) we denote the position of the alternative c in the
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ranking of voter v; the top-ranked alternative has position 1, the second best has position
2, etc.
Definition 6. Given an n-profile P over set A of alternatives, a mapping r : P×A→ Q+0
is called a misrepresentation function if for any voter v ∈ N and any two candidates
c, c′ ∈ A the condition posv(c) < posv(c
′) implies r(v, c) ≤ r(v, c′).
In the classical framework the misrepresentation of a candidate for a voter is a func-
tion of the position of the candidate in the preference order of that voter given by
s = (s1, . . . , sm), where 0 = s1 ≤ s2 ≤ . . . ≤ sm, that is, the misrepresentation func-
tion in this case will be r(v, c) = sposv(c). An important particular case is the Borda
misrepresentation function defined by the vector (0, 1, . . . , m − 1) which was used in
Chamberlin and Courant (1983). In what follows we assume that the misrepresentation
function is defined for any number of alternatives and that it is polynomial-time com-
putable.
In the approval voting framework, if a voter is represented by a candidate whom she
approves, her misrepresentation is zero, otherwise it is equal to one. This function is
called the approval misrepresentation function. This misrepresentation function does not
have to be positional since different voters may approve different number of candidates.
In the general framework the misrepresentation function may be arbitrary.
By w : N → A we denote the function that assigns voters to representatives (or the
other way around), i.e., under this assignment voter v is represented by candidate w(v).
If |w(N)| ≤ k we call it a k-assignment. The total misrepresentation Φ(P,w) of the
given election under w is then given by Φ(P,w) =
∑
v∈N r(v, w(v)) or Φ(P,w) =
maxv∈N r(v, w(v)) in the utilitarian and egalitarian versions, respectively. The Cham-
berlin-Courant rule takes the profile and the number of representatives to be elected
k as input and outputs an optimal k-assignment wopt of voters to representatives that
minimizes the total misrepresentation Φ(P,w). We will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 7. For every polynomial-time computable dissatisfaction function, every posi-
tive integer k, and for both utilitarian and egalitarian versions of the Chanberlin-Courant
rule, there is a polynomial-time algorithm that given a profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) over a set
of alternatives A = {a1, . . . , am}, which is single-crossing with respect to some tree, finds
an optimal k-assignment function wopt for P .
Let T be a tree. Any subtree T ′ of T such that T \T ′ is also a tree be called a terminal
subtree of T . Let us denote by st(T ) the set of all terminal subtrees of T , including T . An
important example of a terminal subtree can be obtained from any ab-cut. Indeed, both
subtreees Tab and Tba, which result from this cut are terminal. Let us, for i ∈ N , denote
by st−i(T ) the set of all terminal subtrees for which i ∈ N is not a vertex.
Lemma 3. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a profile over a set A = {a1, . . . , am} of alternatives,
where P is single-crossing with respect to a minimal tree T . Let wopt is an optimal k-
assignment for P . Let voter 1 be an arbitrary vertex of T , and let b ∈ A be the least
preferred alternative of voter 1 in w(N). Then the vertices of w−1(b) are vertices of a
terminal subtree of T .
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Proof. On a tree T we may define the distance between any two vertices u and v which
is the number of edges on the unique path connecting these two vertices. Let v be the
closest vertex to 1 such that w(v) = b. Let u be the vertex on that path which is one
edge closer to 1 (it can be actually 1 itself). Due to minimality of T the edge (u, v) is
an (a, b)-cut for some a = w(u) where a ≻1 b. Let us show that w
−1(b) = Vba. Suppose
first that w(v′) = b. Then b ≻v′ a (otherwise v
′ would be assigned a) and hence v′ ∈ Vba.
Suppose now v′ ∈ Vba. Then v
′ is connected by a path within Vba, hence the unique path
between 1 and v′ passes through v. Since linear orders on this path form a classical single
crossing subprofile we have w(v′) = b.
The fact that the least preferred alternative of voter 1 in the elected committee w(N)
represents voters in a terminal subtree of T is important in our design of a dynamic
programming algorithm. In this algorithm we will fix an arbitrary leaf, without loss of
generality it will be voter 1, and reduce the problem of calculating an optimal assignment
for a profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) over a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . , am} to a partially
ordered subproblems which will be defined shortly. Let us denote the original problem as
(P,A, k). We define the set of subproblems as follows. A pair (P ′, A′, k′), where k′ ≤ k
is a positive integer, P ′ is a subprofile of P and A′ is a subset of A is a subproblem of
(P,A, k) if
1. P ′ = Pab, the subprofile of linear orders corresponding to vertices of a subset of
vertices Vab ⊆ N , where a ≻1 b;
2. A′ = {a1, . . . , aj} for some positive integer j such that k ≤ j ≤ n;
3. the goal is to find an optimal assignment w′ : Vab → A with |w
′(Vab)| ≤ k
′.
The idea behind this definition is based on Lemma 3. Namely, we can try to guess the
least preferred alternative of voter 1 in the elected committee aj and the terminal subtree
Vba whose voters are all assigned to aj , then the problem will be reduced to choosing a
committee of size k−1 among {a1, . . . , aj−1} given the profile Pab of voters corresponding
to Vab. We note that there are at most n − 1 subproblems. Note that our cuts can be
naturally ordered: we can say that ab-cut ⊂ cd-cut if and only if Vab ⊂ Vcd.
Following Skowron et al. (2013) we can prove the main theorem of this section.
Proof of Theorem 7. The tree T with respect to which P is single-crossing can be computed
in polynomial time, by Theorem 6. We can identify one of the leaves then. Let this be
voter 1 with preferences a1 ≻1 ... ≻1 am.
For every ab-cut, j ∈ {1, . . . , m} and t ∈ {1, . . . , k} we define A[Vab, j, t] to be the opti-
mal dissatisfaction (calculated in the utilitarian or egalitarian way) that can be achieved
with a t-assignment function when considering a subprofile P ′ = {Pab | 1 ∈ Vab} over
A′ = {a1, . . . , aj}. It is clear that for V ⊆ N , j ∈M \ {1} and t ∈ K \ {1}, the following
recursive relation holds
A[V, j, t] =min
{
A[V, j − 1, t], min
ab-cut
ℓ(A[Vab, j − 1, t− 1],
(r(vi, aj))vi∈Vba)
}
.
11
Here ℓ is used to mean either the sum or the maximum of a given list of values depending
on the utilitarian or egalitarian model, respectively. To account for the possibility that
aj is not elected in the optimal solution, we also include the term A[V, j − 1, t]. Thus,
A[N,m, k] is then the optimal dissatisfaction, and in calculating it we simultaneously find
the optimal k-assignment function.
The following base cases are sufficient for the recursion to be well-defined
• A[∅, j, t] = 0;
• A[V, j, 1] = min
j′≤j
ℓ((r(vi, aj′))i∈V );
• A[V, j, t] = 0 for t ≥ j.
Using dynamic programming, we can compute in polynomial time, in fact, in time
O(mn2k), the optimal dissatisfaction of the voters and the assignment that achieves it.
Note that the complexity is the same as for the classical case.
5 Conclusion
This paper generalises the classical single-crossing property to a single-crossing property
on trees. In this more general setting, we prove various results such as the fact that the
majority relation is transitive as well as a representative voter theorem. Furthermore,
for any tree, there exists a profile of preferences which is single-crossing with respect to
the tree and for which the tree is minimal. Finally we present two results on algorithmic
aspects of single-crossedness. The first one states that recognising single-crossingness on
a tree is polynomial and the second shows that the winner determination problem for the
Chamberlin-Courant rule is also polynomial for single-crossing profiles.
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